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The Reemergence of the "State Action"
Requirement in Race Relations Cases
William Bassett*
Little did knowledgeable legal observers imagine, after the Supreme Court's
hallmark ruling in Jones v. Mayer Co.,' that, within four years, the concept
of state action would undergo as extensive a transitional development as it
has. Yet, since Jones was decided in 1968, the Court has accomplished a
complete turn-about in its interpretation of state action in race relations
cases. It is most unlikely, indeed, that a reader of Jones could have imag-
ined that Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co.2 and Moose Lodge v. Irvis3 would follow
shortly.
In Jones, the cause of action was the refusal of a state-licensed real estate
broker to sell a home to a black couple. The lower court dismissed the ac-
tion on a finding of no state action. Yet in a 7-2 decision, the Supreme
Court held that the 1866 Civil Rights Act provides a remedy under 42
U.S.C. § 1982 that does not depend, for its effectiveness, on a finding of state
action. The Act, the Court held, outlaws all acts of discrimination, whether
they be public or private. Any discriminatory action was the very vestige,
the very badge, and the very incident of slavery that the thirteenth amend-
ment was enacted to abolish. Section 1982 contains no exemptions for
sales of private homes; in fact, it contains no contractual exemptions whatso-
ever. In short, Jones combined the thirteenth amendment and its enabling
power with the century-old Civil Rights Act to produce a comprehensive
anti-discriminatory package under the doctrine of substantive equality of all
citizens to enter any contractual transaction. The point is simply that
* Associate Professor, The School of Canon Law, The Catholic University of
America; M.A., University of Illinois, 1958; S.T.L., St. Mary of the Lake Seminary,
Mundelein, 1959; J.C.D., Gregorian University, Rome, 1965; J.D., The Catholic Uni-
versity of America, 1971.
1. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
2. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
3. 92 S. Ct. 1965 (1972).
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Jones rejected the need to find state action where the constitution or any
federal law was violated.
Less than two years later, however, in Adickes the Court construed the same
post-Civil War statute under § 1983 to require a finding of state action. While
serving as a volunteer teacher for black children in Mississippi, Sandra
Adickes, a white woman from New York, entered a restaurant with six of
her students for the purpose of eating lunch. A waitress, under instructions
from the restaurant manager, took the students' orders, but refused to serve
Miss Adickes because she was in the company of blacks. Leaving the res-
taurant, the teacher was arrested by local police on a charge of vagrancy.
The case was not brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which, though
it covered restaurants and most places of public accommodation, 4 was limited
to offering injunctive relief, rather, it was brought under § 1983, which pro-
vides a civil remedy for damages. Adickes alleged that the restaurant's refusal
to serve her violated her right, under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment, not to be discriminated against on the basis of race.
A directed verdict in favor of Miss Adickes resulted, both on the district
and appellate levels. Rejecting an entire line of cases, the Supreme Court
held that an action to rectify a violation of civil rights required at least
minimal state involvement to trigger the equal protection clause.
To many observers, the reassertion of the state action concept in Adickes
was little more than a temporary setback in the distinctly American quest
for freedom in justice. However, the Court's most recent decision on race
relations, Moose Lodge v. Irvis, has dispelled all doubts. State action is
here to stay.
K. Leroy Irvis, Speaker of the Pennsylvania State House and a black man,
was refused service in the dining room of Moose Lodge No. 107, a fraternal
organization in Harrisburg. The federal district court for the Middle Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania held that the equal protection clause barred the State
Liquor Control Board's issuance of a liquor license to a fraternal lodge that,
in the constitution of its supreme lodge, denied membership to non-whites.
Indeed, the court posited, the very retention of a liquor license required that
all persons be served. Finally, the court concluded that the discrimination
by the local chapter of the Moose bore the attributes of state action to such
an extent that it fell within the prohibition of the equal protection clause.
On appeal, the Supreme Court, by a 6-3 vote, overturned the lower
court's opinion. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Rehnquist viewed the
total factual situation and found the lodge to be "a private club in the ordi-
4. Title II, §§ 201-207, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a et seq. (1970).
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nary meaning of the term."5 While conceding that "the impetus for the for-
bidden discrimination need not originate with the State if it is state action
that enforces privately originated discrimination," the Court argued that the
mere issuance of a liquor license was not enough to bring the lodge within
state action requirements.
Viewed together, Adickes and Moose Lodge represent a substantial shift
in Supreme Court standards. Dissenting in Adickes, Mr. Justice Douglas
deplored the continuing preoccupation of the Court with the search for
state involvement in racial discrimination cases. "It is time," he wrote,
we stopped being niggardly in construing civil rights legislation.
It is time we kept up with Congress and construed its laws in the
full amplitude needed to rid their enforcement of the lingering
tolerance for racial discrimination that we sanction today. 6
In contrast to the promise of freedom of Jones, Adickes and Moose Lodge
represent a step backwards. How far backwards, however, is problematic.
Value judgments upon a long line of federal and state precedents spanning
almost a century must necessarily be conditioned and relative.
Strict Constructionism and the Narrowing Line:
Seventy Years of Restrictive Interpretation
The modern law of race relations may justly be considered to have begun in
1954 with the school integration decision in Brown v. Board of Education.
7
Since that time, the civil rights movement has penetrated every facet of a
growing national concern for civil, political, and social justice. In response
to the harsh reality of centuries of offical encouragement and toleration of
the grossest inequities, courts have progressed in their expansion of the prin-
ciple of freedom over this decade and a half in a way that truly represents
a legal revolution. The arrival of Adickes and Moose Lodge, perhaps only
a momentary pause for judicial reflection, could present a substantial ob-
stacle to a full realization of the goals of the revolution.
While Jones and Adickes supplied the case reporters with pages of Con-
gressional debate on the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871,8 this article
5. 92 S. Ct. at 1970.
6. 398 U.S. at 188.
7. See Larson, The New Law of Race Relations, 1969 Wisc. L. Rev. 470, 471
[hereinafter cited as Larson].
8. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was essentially re-enacted after the adoption of
the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments in three Acts aimed at quelling
Southern resistance to their implementation. Termed the Enforcement Act, the Force
Act, and the Ku Klux Klan Act, the statutes were: Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat.
140; Act of Feb. 28, 1871, 16 Stat. 933; Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13. Codifica-
tion of these statutes was provided in sections 5506-5532 of the Revised Statutes
1972]
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will go directly to the judicial decisions themselves in the conviction that they
are more productive of insight than the Congressional discussion of a hun-
dred years ago.0
The 1883 Civil Rights Cases'0 are generally taken as the starting point
for analysis of two distinct propositions: whether Congress is constitu-
tionally invested with the power to legislate directly against private acts of
racial discrimination by § 5 of the fourteenth amendment;" and whether
the self-executing clause, § 1,12 of the amendment is a prohibition solely
against state action.
Five cases of discrimination against blacks in hotels, restaurants, theaters,
places of public amusement, and transportation were brought to the Supreme
Court under the Civil Rights Act of 1875.13 The Act was struck down as
unconstitutional; no cause of action was found; the fourteenth amendment
was declared to be no shield against purely private action; and a veritable
anthology of dicta was recorded in Justice Bradley's restrictive majority opin-
ion to chill generations of subsequent litigants trying to bring an action to se-
cure constitutional rights under the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments.
(1875). This Reconstruction legislation, though considerably modified over the years,
still forms the basis of federal statutory civil rights law. See, e.g. 18 U.S.C. §§ 241,
242; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-89; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1443 (1964).
9. For historical studies in review of the Acts and Amendments following the
Civil War see JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1965); Fairman,
Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5
(1949); Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV.
1323 (1952); Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
Against Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353 (1964). Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio,
Bemused and Confused Muse, 1968 Sup. Cr. REv. 89, 99-122; Black, The Lawfulness of
the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960); Black, Foreword: "State Action,"
Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARv. L. REV. 69 (1967); Note:
The "New" Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1294
(1969); Note: The Strange Career of "State Action" Under the Fifteenth Amendment,
74 YALE L.J. 1448 (1965). For case analyses, see LOCKHART, KAMISAR, CHOPER, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW, 1276 (2d ed. 1967); FREUND, SUTHERLAND, HOWE & BROWN, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 971, 1250 (3rd ed. 1967). Extended statutory and case commentary
can also be found in EMERSON, HABER & DORSEN, 2 POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN
THE UNITED STATES II (1967) (1969 Supp.).
10. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
11. "Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legis-
lation, the provisions of this article."
12. "Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
13. 18 Stat. 335 (1875). The Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1870 and 1871 were not
in contest. The Act of 1875 was a public accommodations statute. See Avins, The
[Vol. 22:39
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Under the fourteenth amendment, Justice Bradley held that Congress has
no power to legislate against private wrongs. Congressional legislation must
be directed to relief from the actions of the States:
14
It does not invest Congress with power to legislate upon subjects
which are within the domain of State legislation; but to provide
modes of relief against State legislation. . . . It does not au-
thorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for the regula-
tion of private rights; but to provide modes of redress against the
operation of State laws, and the action of State officers executive
or judicial, when these are subversive of the fundamental rights
specified in the amendment. Positive rights and privileges are un-
doubtedly secured by the Fourteenth Amendment; but they are
secured by way of prohibition against State laws and State pro-
ceedings affecting those rights and privileges ...
Furthermore, Bradley held that to conceive of barring blacks from res-
taurants and places of public accommodation as a vestige of slavery was to
run the slavery-abolition concept into the ground. This attitude, of course,
paved the way for the separate-but-equal doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson,'5
where racial segregation in public transportation did not violate the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Thus, the significant re-
striction of those privileges and immunities that fell within the scope of the
fourteenth amendment, announced in the Slaughter House Cases in 1873,16
Civil Rights Act of 1875: Some Reflected Light on the Fourteenth Amendment and
Public Accomodations, 66 COL. L. REv. 873 (1966).
14. 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). This principle is succinctly expressed in Love v.
Chandler, 124 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1942) and in the Supreme Court in Collins v.
Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951): "The statutes [civil rights acts], while they granted
protection to persons from conspiracies to deprive them of the rights secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, did not have the effect of taking into federal
control the protection of private rights against invasion by individuals." Love at 786.
In Jones, supra note 1, the Court noted the opinion of Bradley in The Civil Rights
Cases regarding the unconstitutionality of the Act of 1875, but did not pass on its
continued validity, holding the question academic since the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The Court did observe, however, that all its members were in agreement that Congress
could outlaw private acts of discrimination. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787
(1966) and United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) both hold that Congress can
use its legislative authority under Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to make
conduct illegal, even though that same conduct would not be unconstitutional under
the amendment as a self-executing provision. Both cases involve criminal prosecution
under statutes which are the criminal counterparts of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and
1983 (1964). Although the Justices differed in their opinions, the majority clearly
found that Congress was enabled to reach private acts under the fourteenth amend-
ment, although exclusively private acts are not unconstitutional under the fourteenth
amendment considered as a self-executing provision. Thus, in the Civil Rights Acts
of 1964, Congress could abolish all reference to the involvement of interstate com-
merce or the presence of state action.
15. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
16. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). But in Strauder v. Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1879), a state law excluding Negroes from jury duty was declared unconstitutional.
1972]
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was further narrowed to avoid application also of the thirteenth amend-
ment. 17
The first Mr. Justice Harlan objected strenuously to the majority holding
in The Civil Rights Cases in a classic dissent, urging that the Court's de-
cision had emasculated the noble effort to "prevent any class of human be-
ings in this nation from ever being subject to another class."' 8  He main-
tained that Congress did, indeed, have the power to legislate in prohibition
of all acts of racial discrimination. Moreover, he noted that:
In every material sense . . . railroad corporations, keepers of inns,
and managers of places of public amusement are agents or instru-
mentalities of the State, because they are charged with duties to
the public, and are amenable . . . to governmental regulation.
...[W]ithin the principle settled in Ex parte Virginia, a denial,
by these instrumentalities of the State, to the citizen, because of
his race, of that equality of civil rights secured to him by law, is a
denial by the State, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. If it be not, then that race is left . . .practically at the
mercy of corporations and individuals wielding power under the
States. .... 19
The bitter legacy of racial exploitation following these cases bears out the
realism of Harlan's dire admonition. 20
It should be noted that Prigg v. Pennsylvania,2' sustaining the constitu-
tionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1782, was not even discussed in The
Civil Rights Cases. In Prigg, Mr. Justice Story maintained that:
If, indeed, the Constitution guarantees the right, and if it re-
quires the delivery upon a claim of the owner . . . the natural in-
ference certainly is, that the national government is clothed with
the appropriate authority and functions to enforce it. The funda-
mental principle applicable to all cases of this sort, would seem to
be, that where the end is required, the means are given .... 22
17. Larson, supra note 3, at 487.
18. 103 U.S. 3, 62 (1883).
19. Id. at 58-59. Harlan cited many cases in support of his contention that public
function and governmental regulation are sufficient grounds to find state action. New
Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 344, 848 (1848); Olcott v.
Sup'rs., 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 678 (1872) (public conveyances on land and water); Rex
v. Ivens, 7 Car. & P. 213 (32 E.C.L. 495) (inns and restaurants).
20. Professor Charles Black believes that the proposition that the state was respon-
sible only for discriminatory injury directly and exclusively inflicted by its own acts
reflected a reluctance on the part of the members of the Court to know as Justices
what they knew as men: that there are no meaningful lines between that which the
state tolerates, that which it encourages, and that which it effects. Black, Forward:
"State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV.
69 (1967).
21. 41 U.S. (17 Pet.) 539 (1842).
22. Id. at 614-15.
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Moreover, where the States are unable to protect civil rights, Congress
can reach private discriminatory action.23 The federal courts had accepted
many of these cases between 1870 and 1880.24 While these cases stand for
the proposition that Congress can act against private racial criminality, they
were not followed in The Civil Rights Cases.
The crucial test of the fifteenth amendment came in United States v.
Cruikshank,25 where a mob of more than a hundred whites had been in-
dicted for attacking and killing blacks who had attended a political rally in
Louisiana. Here Justice Bradley discussed the Prigg decision, conceding
that "Congress has power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, every right
given or guaranteed by the Constitution. ' 26 "The method of enforcement,"
the Court said, "will depend on the character of the right conferred. 12 7 In
his decision, Bradley distinguished the fifteenth from the fourteenth amend-
ment:
The real difficulty in the present case is to determine whether
the amendment has given congress any power to legislate except to
furnish redress in cases where the states violate the amendment.
Considering . . . that the amendment . . . substantially guaran-
ties the equal right to vote to citizens of every race and color, ...
congress has the power to secure the right not only against the
unfriendly operations of state laws, but against outrage, violence,
and combinations on the part of individuals, irrespective of state
laws.28
The case was dismissed, however, for failure to prove racial motivation in
the crime. Regarding the fourteenth amendment, Bradley was less liberal
in his construction:
With regard to those acknowledged rights and privileges of the citi-
zen . . . they belong to him as his birthright, and it is the duty
of the particular state of which he is a citizen to protect and en-
force them . . . (w)hen any of these rights and privileges are se-
cured in the constitution of the United States only by a declaration
that the state or the United States shall not violate or abridge them,
it is at once understood that they are not created or conferred by
the constitution, but that the constitution only guaranties that they
shall not be impaired by the states or the United States . . . . The
affirmative enforcement of the rights and privileges themselves,
23. Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against
Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353, 1359-60 (1964).
24. United States v. Given, 25 F. Cas. 1324, 1325-26 (No. 15, 210) (C.C.D. Del.
1873); United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79, 81-82 (No. 15, 282) (C.C.S.D. Ala.
1871); United States v. Crosby, 25 F. Cas. 701 (No. 14, 893) (C.C.D. S.C. 1871).
25. 25 F. Cas. 707 (14,897) (C.C.D. La. 1874).
26. Id. at 710.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 713.
1972]
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unless something more is expressed, does not devolve upon it
[the United States], but belongs to the state government as a part
of its residuary sovereignty.2 9
This restrictive construction, built upon a theory of state sovereignty and
federalism and conditioned by an apprehension of a federal criminal code,
was to prevail. 30  Even so, in Ex parte Yarbrough,"1 the Court held the
power of the federal government to reach racially motivated infringement of
the right to vote valid under the fifteenth amendment.
The mood of the Court changed at an imperceptible rate. In Williams v.
Mississippi,3 2 it was held that a state plan to legalize white supremacy as
the basis of Mississippi's political institutions did not violate the fifteenth
amendment. And, in James v. Bowman, 33 the Court, failing even to men-
tion Yarbrough, found that state action was required to bring an action un-
der both the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. The state action re-
quirement under the fifteenth amendment was finally discarded in 1953 in
Terry v. Adams.
3 4
The need for a finding of positive state action in racial discrimination
cases, however, is well-established. Buchanan v. Warley35 struck down a city
zoning ordinance enforcing integration in Louisville. Yick Wo v. Hopkins30
found the discriminatory administration of a San Francisco fire ordinance by
city officials to be constitutionally reprehensible interference with the rights of
Chinese-Americans.
Yet, purely private discrimination was untouched in Hodges v. United
States.3 7 There a group of whites had terrorized Negroes at a mine and their
29. Id. at 710.
30. In the companion case, United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875), the same
reasoning prevailed. Chief Justice Waite said Congress could proscribe only state ac-
tion under the fourteenth amendment, but reach private activities under the fifteenth.
92 U.S. at 217-18.
31. 110 U.S. 651 (1884). The fifteenth amendment, the Court held, "does, proprio
vigore, substantially confer on the [N]egro the right to vote, and Congress has the
power to protect and enforce that right." 110 U.S. at 665.
32. 170 U.S. 213 (1898).
33. 190 U.S. 127 (1903).
34. 345 U.S. 461 (1953). But see Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892),
involving the protection of an Indian in custody from a mob, where Congressional
power to make laws to secure constitutional rights was upheld.
35. 245 U.S. 60 (1917). See also Harman v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927); Rich-
mond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930). These cases, outlawing racial zoning laws for
housing, led persons to rely on the restrictive covenants finally ineffectuated in Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
36. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
37. 203 U.S. 1 (1906). This case was overturned by Jones: The conclusion of
the majority in Hodges rested upon a concept of congressional power under the thir-
teenth amendment irreconcilable with the position taken by every member of this
Court in The Civil Rights Cases and incompatible with the history and purpose of
[Vol. 22:39
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employer had discharged them. An action was brought under the four-
teenth amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The Court, reversing the con-
viction of the white members of the mob, said it had been repeatedly held
that the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments are restrictions on state ac-
tion and no state action had been alleged. Moreover, the thirteenth amend-
ment, the Court held, gave no special protection to blacks. It would be
patently unconstitutional for Congress to assert power under the thirteenth
amendment to safeguard all racial groups from private injury motivated by
racial prejudice. The 1890 Annual Report of the Attorney-General, citing
rampant lawlessness and the abridgement of constitutional rights, com-
plained that "Federal courts have no adequate jurisdiction over these of-
fenses."'38 The Report urged the States to uphold their laws in prosecuting
these crimes. Even murders and mob savagery were said to be beyond the
jurisdiction of the federal courts without a showing of direct state involve-
ment.39 The State itself had to be at fault before an action would lie.
This narrow and formalistic insistence upon positive and affirmative state
action findings to get jurisdiction under the Constitution lasted until well
after the Second World War. By this interpretation, federal powers were
only incurred by positive intervention of the states.40  If a state refused to
act, federal powers could not act. Federal authority could not be a vehicle
for directly initiating measures to promote the rights secured under the thir-
teenth, fourteenth, or fifteenth amendments.
Two stultifying effects resulted from this doctrine. First, Congress was
discouraged from using its powers under the enabling sections of the amend-
ments, even when the necessary, affirmative state action existed. And,
more importantly, it effectively precluded a "positive duty" analysis of the
fourteenth amendment. The states had only a negative duty not to di-
rectly revoke constitutional rights protected by the amendment by denying the
exercise of those rights to persons within the state.
This, of course, set the stage for widespread passive toleration of innu-
merable kinds of "private" racial discrimination. As long as state legisla-
the Amendment itself. "Insofar as Hodges is inconsistent with our holding today, it is
hereby overruled." 392 U.S. at 442-43, n.78.
38. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (1890).
39. Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892); United States v. Sanges, 48 F. 78
(C.C. Ga. 1891), writ of error dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 144 U.S. 310 (1892);
Ex parte Riggins, 134 F. 404 (C.C. Ala. 1904); United States v. Powell, 151 F. 648
(C.C. Ala. 1907). In both Riggins and Powell, Judge Jones speaks eloquently of the
frustiation of the binding authority of the rule to find positive state action to bring a
case before the federal courts under the fourteenth amendment. Mr. Justice Frank-
fuiter summarized these cases in United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 92-93 (1951).
40. See Morris & Powe, Constitutional and Statutory Rights to Open Housing, 44
WASH. L. REV. 1, 15 (1968).
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tures did nothing, federal power to intervene was nullified, even if these
private acts were so common that they constituted a community pattern and
way of life. They were still constitutionally immune because "private."
Thus, for almost a hundred years after the Emancipation Proclamation,
black men and women were helpless to protect themselves against the in-
justice borne under an institutionalized racism.
In the conviction that future cases should be argued with the fullest possi-
ble care, it is time to turn our attention to a delineation of the various theories
of state action that have been supported in race relations cases in the past
two decades of this second phase of civil rights litigation. Added signifi-
cance to this discussion is drawn from the fact that the composition of the
Court has changed greatly since Jones was decided in 1968. The majority
of seven justices voting in Jones was reduced, by Moose Lodge, to a minority
of three. Future changes in Court personnel could possibly lead to a de-
emphasis upon state action again.
The Seven Ways to Find State Action; or, Getting a Foot in the Door
A successful action in a race relations case must contain three essential
elements: (1) proof of state involvement; (2) proof of an invasion of a
litigant's constitutional right; (3) proof that the invasion of the constitu-
tional right resulted from or in some way involved the participation of the
state.
With allowance for some overlapping and the complication of multiple
factors of involvement, the theories of state action found in race relations
cases can be categorized under seven headings: (1) the use of the courts
for judicial enforcement of private discriminatory schemes; (2) intervention
by police or state officials applying statutes, not discriminatory per se to fos-
ter segregation; (3) financial assistance and support of institutions employ-
ing discriminatory policies; (4) the delegation to private parties or associa-
tions of public governmental functions allowing them to discriminate; (5)
significant state involvement in projects or enterprises conducted on a dis-
criminatory basis; (6) state regulation, chartering or licensing of businesses
or associations that discriminate; and (7) deliberate state refusal to act in
the face of widespread racial discrimination in such a way that this refusal
may be construed as encouraging or authorizing private acts of racial dis-
crimination.
1. The Use of the Courts for Private Discriminatory Schemes
As Mr. Justice Bradley observed in The Civil Rights Cases, the fourteenth
amendment is a shield, not only against state legislation, but against "state
[Vol. 22:39
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action of every kind."41  The use of the judicial branch of the government
to enforce private discriminatory schemes, however, was first declared un-
constitutional in the still controversial case of Shelley v. Kraemer.42  Some
commentators have proclaimed that Shelley marked the demise of state ac-
tion,43 but it actually purported to do no such thing.
44
The case involved a suit for court enforcement of a restrictive covenant
to bar a Negro from ownership of a home he had bought from a private
seller. The court was asked to enforce the covenant and divest Shelley of
tide, revesting it in the grantor or any other person the court may choose.
The Supreme Court of Missouri upheld the covenant as valid and found that
its enforcement violated no rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
There was ample precedent at the time for questioning restrictive cove-
nants in the courts. For example, in Clifton v. Puente, when an original
grantor retook property and a Mexican-American possessor sued to evict, he
could not be denied relief on the ground that the enforcing court had merely
abstained from action, leaving private individuals free to impose such discrim-
ination as they see fit.45 In Hansberry v. Lee46 the Supreme Court carefully
41. This point is too evident to need substantiation in case citation. The line-up of
ordinances maintaining de jure racially discriminatory policies that have been struck
down since the decision in Brown v. Board of Education can be found in EMERSON,
HABER & DORSEN, supra note 9. Note most recently, the striking down of Virginia's
anti-miscegenation statute in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). In United States
v. Guest, Mr. Justice Brennan said,
The Fourteenth Amendment commands the state to provide the members of
all races with equal access to the facilities it owns or manages, and the right
of a citizen to the use of these facilities without discrimination on the basis
of race is a basic corollary of the command.
383 U.S. 745, 780 (1966). In Loving v. Virginia, in striking down a Florida statute
making cohabitation by a white person with a Negro a crime, Mr. Justice Stewart,
concurring, said, "[lilt is simply not possible for a state law to be valid under our
Constitution which makes the criminality of an act depend upon the race of the actor."
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 198 (1964).
42. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitu-
tional Law, 73 HAiv. L. REV. 1 (1959) and the reply of Professor Pollak, Racial Dis-
crimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L.
REV. 1 (1959); Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA.
L. REV. 473 (1962). The most recent in a great battery of articles continuing this
fundamental controversy is a very interesting study by Judge J. Skelly Wright, criticizing
both Herbert Wechsler and Alexander Bickel for essentially similar reasons of what he
thinks is an excessively rigid academic logic: Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly
Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769, 775 (1971).
43. Schubert, State Action and the Private University, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 323, 325
(1970). See Comment, The Impact of Shelley v. Kraemer On the State Action Con-
cept, 44 CAL. L. REV. 718, 733 (1956): "If obtaining court aid to carry out 'private'
activity 'converts' such private action into 'state' action, then there could never be any
private action in any practical sense."
44. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
45. 218 S.W.2d 272 (Cir. App. Tex., 1949).
46. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
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avoided discussion of the constitutional issue to uphold the action of a lower
court enjoining white property owners from violating a restrictive covenant.
In Shelley, however, the Court held judicial enforcement of such a cove-
nant to be a violation of the 1866 Civil Rights Act. It asserted that dis-
criminatory restrictions, if imposed by statute or ordinance, are unconstitu-
tional. While not declaring the covenants illegal, the Court said that en-
forcement by the courts of such covenants is just as much state action as
legislation itself.47 But for the action of the enforcing court, a willing buyer
and a willing seller would have been able to contract. The State made
available the full coercive power of government to prevent that contract,
thus denying petitioners their constitutional right.
Judicial action, Shelley held, is not immunized from the operation of the
fourteenth amendment because it is pursuant to a state common law policy;
nor is it exempt because a particular pattern of discrimination was arranged
by private agreement. State action violative of the fourteenth amendment
was found in the exertion of government authority to implement a discrimi-
natory scheme.
Comment following Shelley was mixed and uncertain, though there was a
prevailing immediate awareness that the extension of the state action con-
cept to the use of the courts in adjudicating what had been considered pri-
vate matters was a revolutionary turn in the law.
48
Perhaps the impact of Shelley was most clearly seen in Barrows v. Jack-
son.49 There, the Supreme Court refused to permit enforcement of a claim
47. Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust and Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 680 (1930), and
Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879), were both cited for the proposition that
judicial action constitutes state action. The Court cited further cases wherein court
action had amounted to a denial of constitutionally protected rights: Moore v. Demp-
sey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915); American Fed'n of
Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941); Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296 (1940) and
Bridges v. Calif., 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
48. Huber, Revolution in Private Law?, 6 S.C.L.Q. 8, 26 (1953):
It would seem, under Shelley v. Kraemer, that he [a Negro refused the
right to rent a home] could bring suit alleging denial of equal protection of the
laws. Even if the court wished to dismiss the suit as not stating a cause of
action . . . it would seem that the court could not do so without supporting
the discrimination.
See Comment, The Impact of Shelley v. Kraemer on the State Action Concept, 44
CAL. L. REV. 718, 723, 733-36 (1956); Lathrop, The Racial Covenant Cases, 1948
Wis. L. REv. 508, 525; Scanlan, Racial Restriction in Real Estate-Property Values
Versus Human Values, 24 NOTRE DAME LAW. 157, 172-73 (1949). See also Horowitz,
The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30
S.C. L. REV. 208, 213 (1957). For an interesting earlier study on this point, consult
McGovney, Racial Residential Segregation by State Court Enforcement of Restrictive
Agreements, Covenants or Conditions in Deeds Is Unconstitutional, 33 CAL. L. REV.
5, 30 (1945).
49. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
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for damages for breach of a restrictive covenant against one who had con-
veyed land to a Negro in violation of his contract. Judicial enforcement of
such a contract was held to be violative of the fourteenth amendment. Shel-
ley has also been extensively applied in landlord-tenant cases.50 Edwards
v. Habib,1 involved a landlord's retaliatory eviction of tenants for reporting
violations of housing code regulations. The D.C. Circuit Court held that
judicial application of state common law, even in a controversy between pri-
vate parties, may constitute state action which must conform to the constitu-
tional strictures which constrain the government. This is true even where
the court is simply enforcing a privately negotiated contract. In Rice v.
Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.,52 a claim for damages was up-
held where a racially restrictive clause in a contract had enabled a cemetery
to refuse burial to the Indian husband of an Iowa widow.
A leading case in judicial enforcement of discriminatory schemes involved
the trusteeship of Senator Augustus 0. Bacon's will.5 3  In 1911, Senator
Bacon willed a park to the city of Macon, Georgia, to be used by whites only.
The city was named a trustee on the Park's Board of Managers. While
the park was segregated for many years, ultimately the city opened its use
to everyone. By the time of the action, the park had become a public facility
which could not be managed and maintained on a segregated basis.
An action was immediately taken to remove the city as a trustee. After
several Negro citizens intervened in the suit, the city tendered its resignation.
The remaining trustees and Senator Bacon's heirs asked for a reversion of
the park to the Senator's estate. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that,
as a matter of law, a court of equity can supervise charitable trusts so that
their purpose would not fail. The bequest of property for the use of a
limited class of people was held valid. 54
The Supreme Court reversed, holding not only that a city cannot enforce
a racially discriminatory will,5 5 but also that a public facility cannot operate
on a private basis. When private individuals are endowed by the state
with powers and functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or
instrumentalities of the State and subject to constitutional limitations. The
park's character, purpose, 56 maintenance, and control made it an integral
50. See, e.g., Abstract Inv. Co. v. Hutchinson, 204 Cal. App. 2d 242, 22 Cal. 2d
309 (1962).
51. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
52. 348 U.S. 880 (1954); see also 245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W.2d 110 (1953).
53. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
54. 220 Ga. 280, 138 S.E.2d 573 (1964).
55. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Dir. of City Trusts of the City of Phila-
delphia, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
56. See, e.g., Public Utilities Comm'n of District of Columbia v. Pollak, 343 U.S.
451 (1952).
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part of the city's functions. Not even a court of equity could then change
its character, in spite of the nature of the private bequest from which it
originated.
Before Evans, there had been suits for declaratory judgments on the valid-
ity of reverter clauses. 57 The question, however, is whether any court can
constitutionally intervene to permit a declaration of purpose, reversion, or
a change of trustee, when the action is brought for the purpose of fostering
discrimination. Does not all such judicial action entail enforcement and
thus prohibited state action?
In the case of the Will of Stephen Girard,58 the city of Philadelphia, acting
through a board of trustees, had maintained a boys' training school for
whites only. Even though private trustees were used, this was held to be un-
constitutional under the fourteenth amendment. On remand, the Pennsyl-
vania courts replaced the city of Philadelphia with private trustees so that
Girard's dominant discriminatory purpose could be fulfilled. The Supreme
Court declined to review the new arrangement. It is, of course, doubtful
that such court action would be allowed today. As one commentator has
noted, "[ilt would be incongruous if philanthropy, while operating with the
helping hand of government and performing the same essential functions,
was to be held to a lesser standard."' 9
The action of the courts received increasingly careful scrutiny in cases
tinged with racial implications. In Levy v. Louisiana, ° the Court main-
tained that a state's wrongful death statute could not be construed to dis-
tinguish between legitimate and illegitimate children, if, in doing so, it de-
nied a remedy to the illegitimates for wrong done to them in the death of
their mother. In jury selection cases, carefully compiled jury lists or other
devices used to exclude Negroes from jury duty in areas of high Negro popu-
lation density have also been held to be evidence of impermissible state ac-
tion.01
57. See, e.g., Charlotte Park & Rec. Comm'n v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d
114 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956); Shelley v. Kraemer was held inapplicable
where use of a park by Negroes created a valid reversion. The action was said to be
an automatic "operation of law," not something achieved through the use of a state
agency. See also Capitol Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Smith, 136 Colo. 265, 316 P.2d
252 (1957).
58. 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
59. Clark, Charitable Trusts, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Will of Stephen
Girard, 66 YALE L.J. 979, 1010 (1957).
60. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). See also Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 931
U.S. 73 (1968); In re Cager, 251 Md. 473, 248 A.2d 384 (1968).
61. Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967); Coleman v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 22
(1967); Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24 (1967); Whippler v. Dutton, 391 F.2d 425
(5th Cir. 1968); Battle v. Peyton, 284 F. Supp. 645 (W.D. Va. 1968); White v.
McHan, 386 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1967). For commentary on the conflict between the
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Courts cannot, of course, give discriminatory acts of private persons the
force of law. Yet, a balance must be struck to preserve the rights of liberty
and property, privacy and voluntary association against the right not to have
the state enforce discrimination against the victim.62  Instead of stressing
an enabling or empowering theory to find the balance, however, it might be
better to lay emphasis upon the positive and affirmative duty of the state to
protect individuals in any area of official involvement.
6 3
2. Police Intervention
The sit-in cases adequately illustrate police-enforced segregation through the
use of city and state ordinances that are non-discriminatory on their face.
If the purpose of state and city legislative bodies in increasing punishments
for criminal trespass or vagrancy is to discourage racial integration, is that
motivation sufficient to render enforcement unconstitutional? 64  In New
York Times v. Sullivan, a civil suit between private parties, Alabama courts
applied state law to impose restrictions on the constitutional right of freedom
of speech:
It matters not that that law has been applied in a civil action and
that it is common law only, though supplemented by statute ...
The test is not the form in which state power has been applied
but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been ex-
ercised.0 5
Indeed "every state official, high and low, is bound by the fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments. ' '0 6 Whenever an officer acts beyond the scope of his
authority67 or in violation of the law,68 he lends the authority of his position
need of high qualifications in, jurors and representative cross sectioning of the popu-
lation, see Mobley v. United States, 379 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1967) and Bokulich v.
Comm'r of Greene County, 394 U.S. 97 (1969). In the following cases, it was held
that the burden of proof shifts to the state to prove exclusion from jury rolls of Ne-
groes was not the product of purposeful discrimination: Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S.
463 (1947); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Arnold v. North Carolina,
376 U.S. 773 (1964); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950).
62. Note Circuit Judge Wright's thoughtful observations in Edwards v. Habib, 397
F.2d 687, 690-96 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
63. Gilbert, Theories of State Action as Applied to the "Sit-In" Cases, 17 Au.
L. REv. 147, 161 (1963). This balancing of interests approach to the problem of
state action is criticized by Lewis, The Role of Law in Regulating Discrimination in
Places of Public Accommodation, 13 BUFFALO L. REV. 402, 414-18 (1964).
64. See Henderson v. Trailway Bus Co., 194 F. Supp. 423 (E.D. Va. 1961); Robin-
son v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964).
65. 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
66. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 25 (1960).
67. Id. and Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931); Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
68. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787
(1966). See also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), where illegal search and de-
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to what he does. If "he acts in the name and for the state, and is clothed
with the State's power, his act is that of the State." 69  It is unconstitutional
to use a state office to deprive any person of the equal protection of the
laws or of those rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United
States. It is even unconstitutional for state officers to threaten or to begin
proceedings to enforce, against parties affected, an unconstitutional act.
70
Discriminatory arrests were first reversed by the Supreme Court in Yick
Wo v. Hopkins in 1886.71 A city ordinance in San Francisco against laun-
dries in wooden buildings was applied only against Chinese to drive them
out of business. Their convictions were reversed under a showing of pur-
poseful unfairness in the application of the law. The case is similar to the
rash of traffic and automobile registration violations suddenly levelled
against blacks registering to vote in Selma, Alabama, in a voter registration
campaign. 72  Three cases illustrate the use of trespass convictions to dis-
courage violations of state segregation policies.
In Lombard v. Louisiana,73 black and white college students were re-
fused service at a segregated lunch counter in McCrory's Five and Ten
Cent Store in New Orleans. They remained at the counter until arrested
for criminal trespass. A week before the sit-in, the Police Superintendent
and the Mayor urged parents to restrain their children from participating in
such activity, since it was "not in the community interest." The facts of the
case disclosed that state policy and local custom, re-inforced by threats from
city officials, induced the restauranteur to refuse service to the students.
The students were subsequently convicted for trespass. The Louisiana Su-
preme Court affirmed on the ground that the restaurant was sufficiently pri-
vate to allow the manager the right to determine which individuals would be
served. The Supreme Court reversed on a showing of coercive involvement
of city officials influencing the manager's conduct.
In Peterson v. City of Greenville,74 blacks were arrested for trespass vio-
lations when they attempted to be served at a whites-only restaurant. The
tention by Chicago police was sufficient grounds for an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
These cases can be extended where the misconduct is attributable to private persons
acting under the aegis of police authority. In Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97
(1951), a private detective, who had been issued a special police officer's badge to
investigate thefts from a local business, beat up suspects to extort confessions. His
action was held to be "under color of law." But actions of a bonding company in
requiring a prisoner are not state action. Thomas v. Miller, 282 F. Supp. 571
(E.D. Tenn. 1968).
69. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1879).
70. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908).
71. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
72. United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967).
73. 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
74. 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
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Court held that, where an ordinance makes it unlawful for owners or mana-
gers of restaurants to seat whites and blacks together, a conviction under the
State's criminal processes, employed in a way which enforces the discrimi-
nation mandated by that ordinance, cannot stand. These city ordinances
now, of course, are a thing of the past. Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act makes free access to restaurants, hotels and places of public accommo-
dation a federally enforceable right. But, as a dissenting Justice Harlan ob-
served, a segregation ordinance constitutes prima facie evidence of invalid
state action, casting on the State the burden of proving that an act of racial
exclusion was, in fact, a product solely of private choice. Thus, Justice
Harlan is correct in saying that, after Peterson and even before the 1964
Civil Rights Act:
Although the right of a private restauranteur to operate, if he
pleases, on a segregated basis is ostensibly left untouched, the
Court in truth effectually deprives him of that right in any State
where a law like this Greenville ordinance continues to exist.
For a choice that can be enforced only by resort to "self-help"
has certainly become a greatly diluted right, if it has not indeed
been totally destroyed.
75
In-Peterson, there was no showing of "state of mind," or proof that the
restauranteur was directly motivated by the ordinance. If the primary con-
cern of the Court had been for the defendant in the case, the actual effect of
the segregation ordinance on the private proprietor would have been rele-
vant. But the Court was equally concerned about others who might be
affected by the pressure of such an ordinance on a variety of proprietors in
a variety of environments.76 In addition, if proof of motivation were re-
quired, there would have to be a showing in each specific case of the
"mental urges of the discriminators." When only the proprietor can know
what his "mental urges" may have been, such a pursuit of direct motivation
would have rendered court action in the desegregation cases impossible.
In Robinson v. Florida,77 the State Board of Health regulations, appli-
cable to restaurants, required racially separate toilet facilities. Demon-
strators responded by staging a sit-in. The protestors were convicted of
criminal trespass. Reversing the convictions, the Supreme Court summa-
rized its position:
While these Florida regulations do not directly and expressly for-
bid restaurants to serve both white and colored people together,
they certainly embody a state policy putting burdens upon any
75. Id. at 252.
76. Lewis, The Sit-in Cases: Great Expectations, 1963 Sup. Cr. REv. 101, 110.
77. 378 U.S. 153 (1964).
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restaurant which serves both races, burdens bound to discourage
the serving of the two races together.7 8
Thus, the use of trespass convictions in Lombard, Peterson, and Robinson
to foster state segregation practices embodied in ordinances, health regula-
tions, and official announcements is an impermissible violation of constitu-
tional rights. Breach of the peace convictions were also reversed where the
convictions were brought to break up sit-in demonstrations in states actively
resisting desegregation.7 9
Absent even a statute or an official declaration of state policy, custom
can become so deeply engrained in the fabric of a community that it itself
has the force of law. Use of police force to preserve a custom of racial
segregation was rejected in Adickes. In Garner v. Louisiana, Mr. Justice
Douglas commented on the force of custom as a factor in determining state
involvement:
[S]tate policy may be as effectively expressed in customs as in
formal legislative, executive or judicial action. . . . Though there
may have been no state law or municipal ordinance that in terms
required segregation of the races in restaurants, it is plain that the
proprietors in the instant case were segregating blacks from whites
pursuant to Louisiana's custom. Segregation is basic to the struc-
ture of Louisiana as a community; the custom that maintains it is
at least as powerful as any law. If these proprietors also choose
segregation, their preference does not make the action "private,"
rather than "state," action. If it did, a miniscule of private prej-
udice would convert state into private action.80
Examples of this concept are readily available.
An evenly divided Court, in Bell v. Maryland,81 vacated trespass convic-
tions, holding that involving the police and the courts to enforce a business-
man's personal policy of racial discrimination was sufficient state action to
violate the fourteenth amendment. Enforcement of personal prejudices by
the courts, Justices Douglas and Goldberg wrote in urging reversal, was im-
permissible state involvement: "Why should we refuse to let state courts
enforce apartheid in residential areas of our cities but let state courts enforce
apartheid in restaurants?" Further, Mr. Justice Goldberg declared, after
78. Id. at 156.
79. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961); Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154
(1962); Cox v. Lousiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Brown v. Lousiana, 383 U.S. 131
(1966); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Gober v. City of Birming-
ham, 373 U.S. 374 (1963); Avent v. North Carolina, 373 U.S. 375 (1963).
80. 368 U.S. at 178-81.
81. 378 U.S. 226 (1964). The court was divided into three judges pro, three in
dissent and three abstentions. The case was remanded to determine whether dismissal
of the criminal proceedings should be in order after passage of a state public accommo-
dations law rendered the conduct no longer illegal.
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legislative analysis of the fourteenth amendment, that no clear distinction
exists between social and civil rights and that the states are positively obliged
by the amendment to insure that all "these rights ran to Negroes as well as
to white citizens."
82
Other types of state action tantamount to threats, intimidation or harass-
ment without the actual use of force were declared unconstitutional in
Goldman v. Olson83 and Dombrowski v. Pfister.84 In Goldman, the resolu-
tions of a state senate creating an investigatory committee were held to be
equivalent to "statutes." In Dombrowski, the Supreme Court affirmed a
federal injunction restraining state prosecution threatening constitutional
rights, where the Governor, police and other law enforcement agencies, and
the chairman of the Louisiana Legislative Joint Committee on Un-American
Activities sought to prosecute members of the Southern Conference Educa-
tional Fund as Communists.
In United States v. Guest,85 involving Ku Klux Klan violence and intimi-
dation of Negroes, where law enforcement officers spread false reports of
criminal activities of Negroes to intimidate them and allowed the Klan to
hold sway, it was held that the involvement of the State need not be either
exclusive or direct. State action can be peripheral or the State only one of
many cooperators in crime.
Courts have frequently intervened where cruel and unusual punishments
are alleged to have been racially motivated 6-or rules have been arbitrarily
promulgated from racial bias. 8
7
In sum, no state office, agency or institution may be constitutionally in-
volved, directly or indirectly, by encouragement or design, singly or in con-
cert with private parties in any act or scheme of racial discrimination.
3. State Financial Assistance or Support
Direct or indirect financial assistance in goods or services to institutions
which follow a policy of racial discrimination is clearly an area of concern
under the fourteenth amendment. Should any institution, regardless of its
82. 378 U.S. 226, 259, 305. For critical review of the opinions in Bell, see Paulsen,
The Sit-in Cases of 1964: "But Answer Came There None," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 137.
In Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964), the hiring of a local sheriff by a pri-
vately owned amusement park to keep Negroes off the premises was held impermissible
and trespass convictions reversed.
83. 286 F. Supp. 35 (W.D. Wis. 1968).
84. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
85. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
86. Beard v. Lee, 396 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1968); Weaver v. Pate, 390 F.2d 145
(7th Cir. 1968); Smartt v. Avery, 370 F.2d 788 (6th Cir. 1967).
87. Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968); Donovan v. Mobley, 291 F.
Supp. 930 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
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private character, be supported by the State in such a way that it may con-
tinue in operation on a segregated basis? Other areas of concern arise where
indirect state assistance-tax exemptions, gratuitous state and municipal
services, state-administered federally funded educational programs-contrib-
ute to give such institutions a position of economic preferment over purely
private businesses. Pierce v. Society of Sistersa" long ago settled the consti-
tutional right to private education. What has yet to be decided, however,
is to what extent may the State constitutionally support such private institu-
tions where they are operated in contravention of what would be permissible
in public institutions. Three broad areas of analogous application can be
found in cases involving hospitals, private schools, and private housing.
Since decisions in the specifications of these areas of state support are very
difficult to interpret, a caveat is in order lest the cases be too hastily con-
strued.
Early cases in these areas are generally found to be quite narrowly inter-
preted. For example, in Johnson v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.,89 FHA and VA
financing of homes was held insufficient state involvement. Eaton v. Board
of Managers of the James Walker Memorial Hospital90 held that state action
was not present where Negro doctors were denied certain courtesy privileges
in a hospital that received extensive grants in aid from the municipality.
The leading case, however, broadening the concept of state involvement in
hospitals receiving public funds is Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital.91 Here the Fourth Circuit held that participation in the Hill-
Burton program made hospitals subject to the fourteenth amendment.
Can state financial aid change the nature of an institution from private to
public for purposes of the guarantee of constitutional rights?9 2 Dicta can be
found regarding the private schools expressing the view that there can be no
such thing as purely private education, in view of the place occupied by ed-
ucation in national life.93 Yet in Guillory v. Tulane Univ., Browns v.
88. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
89. 131 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
90. 261 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959). See also Rack-
ley v. Bd. of Trustees of Orangeburg Reg. Hosp., 310 F.2d 141 (4th Cir. 1962); Thaxton
v. Vaughan, 209 F. Supp. 106 (W.D. Va. 1962), aff'd, 321 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1963).
91. 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963). See also Meredith v. Allen County War Mem-
orial Hospital Comm'n, 397 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1968), where discriminating physicians
were sued under Section 1985 (42 U.S.C.A. § 1985(3) ) for conspiracy.
92. The answer was negative in Norris v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,
78 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1948), wherein relief was denied to Negroes refused entrance
to the Maryland Institute for the Promotion of the Mechanical Arts, an institution de-
clared to be private though 99 percent funded by the city and State. Similarly in
Mitchell v. Boys Club of Metropolitan Police, D.C., 157 F. Supp. 101 (D.D.C. 1957) a
private club remained private though funded and sponsored by the city police.
93. See, e.g., Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane University of Louisiana, 203 F.
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Mitchell,a4 Powe v. Miles,9 5 and Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univer-
sity9 -- all leading cases in private university education-the dicta must be
distinguished from consistent holdings of insufficient state involvement to
bring the private university under the fourteenth amendment.
9 7
There are, of course, degrees of dependence upon public funds. Griffin v.
State Board of Education9" held that, though the receipt of some state as-
sistance did not automatically make private schools subject to the equal pro-
tection clause's ban on racial discrimination, such schools would be con-
sidered state instrumentalities for the purposes of the fourteenth amendment
where they are "predominantly maintained" by such aid. The University
of Tampa was held subject to the fourteenth amendment because its es-
tablishment was largely made possible by the use of surplus city buildings
and other city land.99
State and city contributions to private libraries, 10 0 hospitals,
10 1 motels, 0 2
and fairs,10 3 be that aid directly given or indirectly in supplying land or ser-
vices, have converted some private institutions into state instrumentalities.
Supp. 855, 858-59 (E.D. La. 1962), summary judgment vacated sub nom. Guillory v.
Adm'rs of Tulane Fund, 207 F. Supp. 554, afI'd, 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962).
94. 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969).
95. 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
96. 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
97. See Note, Desegregation of Private Schools: Pursuit and Challenge, 21 N.Y.U.
INTRA. L. REV. 149 (1966).
98. 239 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Va. 1965). This case seems directly contrary to Nor-
ris, supra. See also McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Il. 1968). Griffin
was later modified by Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance Comm'n, 275 F.
Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 389 U.S. 571 (1968). In Poindexter,
the same court that had decided Griffin decided that any financial aid was state ac-
tion. "With deference, we disagree with the criterion the Court applied in Griffin.
The payment of public funds in any amount through a state commission under authority
of state law is undeniably state action. The question is whether such action in aid of
private discrimination violates the equal protection clause." Id. at 854. See also Hall v.
St. Helena Parish School Board, 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961), affd per curiam,
368 U.S. 515 (1962).
99. Hammond v. Univ. of Tampa, 344 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1965).
100. Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 721 (1945).
101. Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964). Here the Fourth Circuit
extended Simkin, supra note 91, to a North Carolina hospital which had not received
a Hill-Burton grant. "State action" was found because the hospital was forced to ob-
tain a license because of the state's Hill-Burton participation and such factors as tax
exemption, construction subsidies, etc.
102. Smith v. Holiday Inns of America, Inc., 336 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1964). The
motel was built on land cleared through government aid to a redevelopment agency.
103. Farmer v. Moses, 232 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). The investment of
city funds in Flushing Meadow Park and the use of city and state funds to build and
maintain their own exhibits were found relevant to a holding that the New York
World's Fair was subject to the fourteenth amendment despite the lack of any govern-
mental contribution to the Fair's operating income.
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In others, however, mere financial assistance was not enough.' 0 4
Perhaps a combination of state financial assistance and administrative
control is a stronger base upon which to construe significant state involve-
ment. In Simkins, not only were 15 percent of the hospital's construction
funds channeled through the State of North Carolina by the Hill-Burton pro-
gram, but also State supervision and operating standards were closely fol-
lowed. 10 5 The hospitals, then, operated
as integral parts of comprehensive joint or intermeshing state and
federal plans or programs designed to effect a proper allocation of
available medical and hospital resources for the best possible pro-
motion and maintenance of public health. 10 6
In view of state compulsory attendance laws, accreditation, affirmative
duties to promote integrated education,10 7 and the fact that private schools
participate in extensive federally-funded programs channeled through the
States,108 is there not sufficient state action to disallow racial segregation in
private schools? Class limitations on religious grounds, as Pierce main-
tained, are not similar to such classifications on racial grounds for purposes
of exemption from the obligations of the fourteenth amendment. This is
particularly true under the Jones interpretation of §1981 and its unre-
stricted freedom to contract, even for private education.
In the field of public funding for housing the leading early restrictive de-
104. In Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609, 613 (D.D.C. 1967) Judge
Holtzoff says: "It would be a dangerous doctrine to permit the Government to inter-
pose any degree of control over an institution of higher learning, merely because it ex-
tends financial assistance to it. . . . Such a result would be intolerable, for it would
tend to hinder and control the progress of higher learning and scientific research.
Higher education can flourish only in an atmosphere of freedom, untrammelled by
Governmental influence in any degree." One may wonder, however, about the rela-
tionship between scientific research, academic freedom, and the "right" to discriminate
on the basis of race. See Note, Constitutionality of Restricted Scholarships, 33
N.Y.U. L. REv. 604 (1958).
105. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963).
106. Id. at 967.
107. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
108. E.g., the National School Lunch Act, 60 Stat. 233 (1946), as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 1759 (1964); the National Defense Education Act, 72 Stat. §§ 1581-90
(1958), 20 U.S.C. §§ 401-45 (1964); and the recent Higher Education Facilities Act
of 1963, 77 Stat. 366 (1963), 20 U.S.C. § 714 (1964). See Abernathy, Expansion of
the State Action Concept under the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 375,
390 (1958):
It may very well be true that state financial aid alone does not render the in-
stitution receiving such aid a state agency. . . . However, a finding of state
financial support plus an unusual degree of control over management and poli-
cies might properly ]cad to characterization of a business or agency as a state
operation . . . . [I]t seems that one practical approach might be to compare
the degree of control over the operation in question with the control exer-
cised over other similar types of businesses or agencies.
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cision is that of Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp.'019 New York City, hav-
ing contracted with a private builder, condemned, sold, and ceded certain
private land to the builder, and granted tax exemption and municipal ser-
vices, all on the builder's promise to build a number of homes and limit its
profits. The builder proceeded to restrict the development to whites only.
In a 4-3 decision, the New York Court of Appeals held that: "The aid which
the state has afforded to [the company] and the control to which [it is]
subject are not sufficient to transmute [its] conduct into state action . .. .,110
This decision is clearly incompatible with later case law such as Gautreaux
v. Chicago Housing Authority,"' where the court ordered integration of
public housing by scattering high-percentage black projects in white neigh-
borhoods, and Hicks v. Weaver," 2 enjoining HUD from giving money to the
Bogalusa Housing Authority because it located public housing in segregated
black neighborhoods.
Can a constitutional case be built around the link with state involvement
in public welfare programs, either for agencies or recipients? In King v.
Smith, 1 3 an Alabama "substitute father" statute was struck down because
it conflicted with federal policy to aid needy children. The Court recog-
nized an obvious fourteenth amendment problem where the law had been
used in Alabama almost exclusively to deny welfare money to Negro moth-
ers. Similarly, a Georgia regulation denying Aid to Families with Dependent
Children to black women, by creating the presumption that all mothers
"suitable" for field work-in most cases, black mothers-could get full
employment in the growing season, was struck down as unconstitutional
under the equal protection clause.1 ' 4  Welfare recipients as wards of the
State are in a special trust relationship with the State, involving a higher
degree of care for their rights than for those of other private persons." r5
109. 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950).
110. Dorsey was strongly criticized at the time by Groner and Helfeld, Race Dis-
crimination in Housing, 57 YALE L.J. 426, 442 (1948) and Note: Applicability of the
Fourteenth Amendment to Private Organizations, 61 HARv. L. REv. 344, 349 (1948):
When Stuyvesant Town excludes Negroes, the effect is the same as if the
eighteen blocks were zoned on racial lines. Such zoning would be prohibited
if done by a state or one of its subdivisions.
111. 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. I11. 1969).
112. 38 U.S.L.W. 2004 (July 1, 1969).
113. 392U.S. 309 (1968).
114. Anderson v. Burson, 300 F. Supp. 401 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
115. See Colon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), where welfare recipients brought a suit alleging unfair discrimination in housing
and rental subsidies. This case involved the New York City Housing and Development
Administration and F.H.A. Sufficient state involvement to bring it under the four-
teenth amendment was found. See also Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority,
398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968) and Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency,
395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
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Increasingly, state financial aid and support given to private institutions
is being tied to close supervision of agency expenditures and programs.
Thus linked, the State must be conceived as a partner with such institutions,
sharing therein its constitutional obligations.
4. Delegation of Public Governmental Functions
Case law has developed four major areas of conspicuous sensitivity to find-
ings of state action and responsibility in the delegation to private persons
of those functions which are public and governmental in their nature. These
are voting, education, union activities and general public solicitation and
concourse.
The voting rights cases are particularly consistent in their findings of state
action and emphasis upon the fundamental right of franchise. Baker v.
Carr," the leading case in the line of reapportionment decisions, empha-
sized the duty of the states to secure fair representation in voting. It lies at
the hub of a galaxy of cases beginning with state primary elections in Nixon
v. Herndon" 7 in 1927 and Nixon v. Condon"" in 1932 and ending with the
final, exasperated disallowance of poll taxes and voting tests in the most re-
cent decisions." 9 The cases mark a trail of dogged attempts by every con-
ceivable ruse and deception to deny Negroes the right to vote.
The Nixon cases stand for the proposition that political parties are not
private clubs and primary elections are part of the basic governmental proc-
esses of the States."10 Negroes may not be constitutionally excluded from
either. Delegation of authority by a state agency to private associations
which deny blacks the vote was also determined to constitute illegal state
116. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
117. 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
118. 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
119. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); Gaston County v. United
States, 288 F. Supp. 678 (D.D.C. 1968), affd, 395 U.S. 285 (1969); Allen v. State
Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969). Even an impartial administration of
literacy tests would perpetuate the inequities of the past. See also Hadnott v. Amos,
394 U.S. 358 (1969).
120. But in Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935), Justice Roberts found no
"state action" in a state Democratic party convention's setting qualifications to exclude
Negroes from membership. Nine years later Grovey was overruled in Smith v. All-
wright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), held the
right to vote includes primary elections when "the state law has made the primary an
integral part of the procedure of choice...." Id. at 318. In Baskin v. Brown, 174
F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1949), the attempt in South Carolina to make political parties private
clubs failed. In these cases a finding of state action in state non-action was made where
there is a duty to see to it that Negroes are not systematically excluded from voting.




participation in Terry v. Adams.121  Where a State delegates an aspect of
the elective process to private groups, the decision reads, they become sub-
ject to the same restraints as the State. There is no possibility of state neu-
trality in withdrawing from direct involvement in such an important function
as the elective process. 122  There is no possibility either of a valid election
by the use of segregated polling places or voting lists.123 Under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3), a cause of action to redress deprivation of federal voting rights
lies against private individuals, even those not acting under color of law.'
24
The Brown decision in 1954 left little doubt about the unconstitutionality
of racially separate schools and school systems. Discarding Plessy v. Fer-
guson, this entire line of cases has sustained the proposition that state edu-
cational facilities that are separate are inherently unequal. 125  Patterns of
tokenism to avoid compliance with Brown have continued throughout the
nation in pupil placement plans, re-zoning of pupil attendance areas, re-
transfer plans, and freedom of choice plans.' 2 6  Systematically, these have
been overturned as impermissible actions of state and local boards of edu-
cation.'2 7 Any plan that does not positively result in integration according
to the State's positive duty under the fourteenth amendment is not consti-
tutionally permissible. 1 28  Even de facto segregation arising from previous
patterns of illegal zoning or restrictive housing may be unconstitutional as
residual effects of state action now positively to be eradicated.
1 29
121. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
122. Note, Negro Disenjranchisement-A Challenge to the Constitution, 47 COL.
L. REy. 76, 86-87 (1947); Comment, 46 MIcH. L. REv. 793, 800 (1948); Note, 61
HARV. L. REV. 1247, 1248 (1948).
123. Bell v. Southwell, 376 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1967).
124. Paynes v. Lee, 377 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1967).
125. Professor Larson lists sixty cases illustrative of unequal separate school facili-
ties, see Larson, supra note 7, at 482-83. For extended factual analysis see also Hobson
v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408
F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
126. The long and sordid history of ratios and assignments to avoid integration in
the South is recorded by Justice Black in United States v. Montgomery County Board
of Education, 395 U.S. 225 (1969). This case involved discrimination against black
teachers. See also Rolfe v. County Bd. of Educ. of Lincoln County, 391 F.2d 77 (6th
Cir. 1968).
127. E.g., Brewer v. Hoxie School District No. 46, 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956);
Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964);
United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
128. Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968);
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
129. United States v. School District 151 of Cook County, Ill., 404 F.2d 1125
(7th Cir. 1968); Bell v. School City of Gary, Indiana, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964). See Wright, Public School Desegregation: Legal
Remedies for De Facto Segregation, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 285 (1965), where he says
compulsory school attendance laws are sufficient state action; and Fiss, Racial Imbalance
in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HpAv. L. REv. 564 (1965).
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Together with the right to vote and the right to education, the right to em-
ployment and the free exchange of commerce are so fundamental that signifi-
cant governmental functions are involved. Thus the control of union activi-
ties has been held an important form of state involvement. "[Plower is
never without responsibility. And when authority derives in part from
Government's thumb on the scales, the exercise of that power by private
persons becomes closely akin, in some respects, to its exercise by the Gov-
ernment itself."' 130
The case is well stated by Justice Murphy, concurring in Steele v. Louis-
ville & N.R.R., 1'3 where a union, as sole bargaining agent for employees,
failed to adequately negotiate for its black members:
The constitutional problem inherent in this instance is clear.
. . . While such a union is essentially a private organization, its
power to represent and bind all members of a class or craft is de-
rived solely from Congress. [I]t cannot be assumed that Con-
gress meant to authorize the representative to act so to ignore the
right guaranteed by the Constitution. Otherwise the Act would
bear the stigma of unconstitutionality under the Fifth Amend-
ment .... .. 2
Racial discrimination by unions is an unfair labor practice under Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Unions have an obligation of good faith
and fair representation to all their members.'133  Exclusion from work' 4 or
apprenticeship programs,' or discriminatory job classifications13 6 are ille-
gal.
3 7
Another related question concerns limits of a governmental function. Is
it a function actually performed by government, usually performed by gov-
ernment or able to be performed by government?
A town like Chickasaw, Alabama, privately owned by Gulf Oil Corpora-
tion, may be so accessible and so much like any other town that the property
interests of the controlling corporation must cede to constitutional restric-
130. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 401 (1950).
131. 323 U.S. 192, 208 (1944). See also NLRB v. Pacific American Shipowners
Ass'n, 218 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1955); Black v. Cutter Lab., 351 U.S. 292 (1956).
132. 323 U.S. at 208.
133. Local 12, United Rubber, Cork, L. & P. Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th
Cir. 1966).
134. Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
135. Todd v. Joint Apprenticeship Committee, 223 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ill. 1963),
vacated as moot, 332 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965).
136. Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
137. For a discussion of remedies, see Weiss, Federal Remedies for Racial Dis-
crimination by Labor Unions, 50 GEO. L.J. 457, 475 (1962).
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tions.138  Since its owners perform public functions, a shopping mall open
to the public, though on private property, becomes a public place.' 3 9  The
principle is simply that, when it performs public functions, a corporation, or
any private institution, may be as subject to constitutional limitations as the
State itself. The corporation or institution may be a creature of the State
or regulated by the State and it may possess sufficient economic power to
invade the constitutional right of an individual to a material degree. The
modern state establishes and depends upon the corporate system to carry out
functions for which the government is responsible. The principle is un-
limited because it follows corporate power wherever it exists. Instead of
nationalizing the corporation, this principle constitutionalizes the function.
5. Significant State Involvement through Multiple Factors
When Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority140 was decided in 1961, the
majority depicted any attempt at a consolidation of the state action cases as
"an impossible task.1' 41 Instead, the Court viewed the total factual situa-
tion to find state action when the Eagle Coffee Shoppe, run by a private lessee,
violated the equal protection clause in refusing to serve a Negro. Burton al-
most defies a closely reasoned elaboration from the precedents at that time.
Yet, since the decision, the rationale of broad and diversified state involve-
ment has been used to analyze complex factual situations and find state re-
sponsibility in a number of different areas.
The Wilmington Parking Authority had been created by the city and was
regulated by state law. The parking facility in which the coffee shop was
located was built with revenue bonds and cash donated by the City of Wil-
mington. After public bidding, the Parking Authority leased the restaurant
on a twenty-year lease, agreeing that it would continue to supply services
and supportive maintenance. The rest of the building was to remain a pub-
lic building. In fact, the Burton Court cited the earlier case of Derrington
v. Plummer142 to the effect that an arms-length negotiation for a lease would
leave the lessee a private entrepreneur. 14  In Burton, however, multiple
138. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). See Berle, Constitutional Limitations
on Corporate Activity-Protection of Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic
Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1952).
139. Amalgamated Food Employees, Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308 (1968).
140. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
141. Id. at 722.
142. 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957).
143. Derrington turned on a "function" test, not the mere fact of leasing. State
action was found because the cafeteria was located in a courthouse where its express
purpose was to serve all who came into the courthouse. Other cases in this line where
state action is seen in restaurants in city and federal airports are Adams v. City of New
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state connections were made beyond the pure fact of leasing. The land
and building were publicly owned; the entire entity was dedicated to "pub-
lic" purposes; the construction and maintenance were partly paid for by
public monies; general supervision was by a tax-exempt agency; and the
profits made by the restaurant were to be paid to the State. All factors seen
together made the State a participant with the restaurant owner. The Court
ruled that a State may not be so involved and allow racial discrimination to
occur.
Burton posed the yet unresolved question of degree or quantity of state
involvement. To what extent does the fourteenth amendment draw into
its purview any private contractor dealing with a state agency? 144  When-
ever a State can prevent discrimination in any of its dealings, is there a posi-
tive obligation to do so? After Moose Lodge v. Irvis, the answers to these
questions are, at the best, problematic.
Public facilities such as golf courses, beaches and parks operated by a
State or its instrumentalities must clearly be open to all on an equal basis. 145
But what if a city or State sells or leases these very facilities to private per-
sons to avoid thereby the need to integrate? Does that process of alienation
absolve the State from a continuing involvement? Even before the question
was mooted by the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the cases were negative.146 As
in Evans v. Newton 147 the web of city services, public access and function
and supportive maintenance has been held sufficient to constitute state ac-
tion under the fourteenth amendment.
6. State Regulation, Chartering or Licensing
Licensing or chartering a private entity to engage in business has not been
held sufficient state involvement to bring the entity under the equal protec-
Orleans, 208 F. Supp. 427 (E.D. La. 1962); Coke v. City of Atlanta, 184 F. Supp. 579
(N.D. Ga. 1960); Nash v. Air Terminal Services, 85 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Va. 1949).
A privately leased theatre in a city hall was called a state instrumentality in Jones v.
Marva Theatres, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 49 (D. Md. 1960). Discriminating in the use of
a motel and its facilities was held to be state action where the motel was located on
city land (part of a municipal airport) and the city had title to improvements and the
purpose of the motel was to provide facilities for the airport. Smith v. City of Birm-
ingham, Ala., 226 F. Supp. 838 (N.D. Ala. 1963).
144. See Note, 75 HIARv. L. REV. 146 (1961).
145. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.
1955), af 'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 877 (1955); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879
(1955).
146. City of Greensboro v. Simkins, 246 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1957); Easterly v.
Dempster, 112 F. Supp. 214 (E.D. Tenn. 1953); Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp.
1004 (S.D. W. Va. 1948); Culver v. City of Warren, 83 N.E.2d 82 (Ohio 1948).
After Burton and relying thereon, see Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320
(5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 911 (1962).
147. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
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tion clause. The spectrum of state licensing requirements is so broad-rang-
ing from registration for automobiles to detailed standards of expectation
and conduct for such businesses as those dispensing drugs, alcoholic bev-
erages or public communications-that the isolated fact of licensing alone
as state action would convert virtually the whole range of private businesses
into state-involved entities. Yet the fact of state approval in licensing and
charter approval procedures is a factor that is featured in dicta in any num-
ber of cases.
In Lombard v. Louisiana, Mr. Justice Douglas said of licensing where a
public restaurant was in question:
There is no constitutional way, as I see it, in which a State can li-
cense and supervise a business serving the public and endow it
with the authority to manage that business on the basis of apar-
theid which is foreign to our Constitution. 148
To the contrary in Bell v. Marland,149 Justices Black, Harlan, and White
agreed that a public restaurant owned by a private person does not become
an agency of the state by licensing. They added that licensing alone cannot
imply a permission of the State directed to racial relations.
In State v. Clyburn,15 0 Slack v. Atlantic White Tower System"' and
William v. Howard Johnson's Restaurants,' 2 licensing was held not to in-
volve state action. The only ruling employing licensing as the basis for in-
voking the fourteenth amendment appears to be Mitchell v. Delaware Al-
coholic Beverage Control Comm'n.15 3 This decision was reversed on ap-
peal,' 54 leaving unanswered the question it raised concerning the constitu-
tionality of a racial test in granting licenses to dealers who will not discrimi-
nate against blacks.
Licensing, together with close regulation, was found to be a "sufficiently
close relation" to the State to force first amendment guarantees in the Dis-
trict of Columbia's public transportation system "buscasting" case-Public
Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak.' 5 The monopoly of street transportation en-
joyed by the company, along with the fact that the public services commis-
148. 373 U.S. 267, 283 (1963). See also Douglas' earlier opinion in Garner v.
Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 176 (1961), and his later opinion regarding licensing real estate
agents in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 385 (1967).
149. 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
150. 247 N.C. 455, 101 S.E.2d 295 (1958).
151. 181 F. Supp. 124 (D. Md. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 284 F.2d 746 (4th
Cir. 1960).
152. 268 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1959).
153. 193 A.2d 294 (Del. 1963).
154. Delaware Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm. v. Mitchell, 196 A.2d 410 (Del.
1963).
155. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
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sion had to approve the particular actions made the actions equivalent to
those of the government.
What kind of responsibility does a State have in granting a license? Bur-
ton maintained that "[N]o State may effectively abdicate its responsibil-
ities by either ignoring them or merely failing to discharge them whatever
the motive may be. 150  Can a State abdicate responsibility where it grants
accreditation or imposes health and safety regulations as a prior condition
to licensing? In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Brown157 general super-
vision of its activities by several state agencies was found relevant to a de-
termination of whether a school for orphans had escaped the application of
the fourteenth amendment by the appointment of private trustees. Per-
haps the key consideration is the power of the State to review licensed ac-
tivities and prevent within the scope of those activities violations of the
Constitution or federal laws. The problem becomes most acute in the con-
troversies centering around the meaning of private clubs and organizations.
Private clubs and similar establishments not in fact open to the public are
specifically excluded from the public accommodations title of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, and various kinds of private associations not falling within
the description of public accommodations are also without coverage under
the new federal legislation. It is, at this point, that our analysis returns to
the new purveyor of state action, Moose Lodge v. Irvis.' 58
In Moose Lodge the decisive factor on the district level was the unique
and pervasive nature of Pennsylvania liquor regulation. The granting of
liquor licenses in Pennsylvania has always been viewed as one in which the
State has the fullest freedom inherent in the police power of the sovereign.
The State possesses a complete monopoly over the sale and distribution of
liquor within its boundaries. Limited resale is permitted for hotels, res-
taurants, and private clubs that possess licenses issued by the Liquor Control
Board. The Board itself exercises discretionary authority in the issuance or
refusal of licenses. To secure one of the limited numbers of licenses availa-
ble in each municipality, an applicant must comply with extensive require-
ments. Once a license has been issued, the licensee must comply with
many detailed requirements or risk its suspension or revocation.
The regulations of the liquor control board affirmatively require that club
licenses must adhere to the provisions of their constitution and by-laws. As
applied to the present case, this regulation required the local lodge to ad-
156. 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
157. 270 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1967), af'd, 392 F.2d 120 (3rd Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921 (1968).
158. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
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here to the constitution of the supreme lodge, and thus to exclude non-
Caucasians from membership in its licensed club.
The district court held that the state action was manifest. In an area so
permeated with state regulation and control, the State cannot be neutral
where it requires compliance by a licensee with the discriminatory pro-
visions of its constitution, particularly where the violation holds the threat
of loss of license. The State, therefore, found itself within the ambit of
actions held unconstitutional by Burton. The Court felt that licensing a
club practicing racial discrimination collided head-on into the central pur-
pose of the fourteenth amendment, to eliminate all official state sources of
invidious racial discrimination in the State. As noted above, the Supreme
Court, by a vote of 6-3, overturned the district court decision. 159
While the majority is patently correct in its assertion that, absent state ac-
tion, private discrimination is not prohibited by the Constitution, the State's
entanglement with liquor regulation--especially the licensing quota system-
is not adequately met. Justice Rehnquist limits his comments on the system
to the following remarks:
The only effect that the state licensing of Moose Lodge to serve
liquor can be said to have on the right of any other Pennsyl-
vanian to buy or be served liquor on premises other than those of
Moose Lodge is that for some purposes club licenses are counted
in the maximum number of licenses which may be issued in a
given municipality. Basically each municipality has a quota of
one retail license for each 1,500 inhabitants. Licenses issued to
hotels, municipal golf courses and airport restaurants are not
counted in this quota, nor are club licenses until the maximum
number of retail licenses is reached. Beyond that point, neither
additional retail licenses nor additional club licenses may be is-
sued so long as the number of issued and outstanding retail li-
censes remains above the statutory maximum. 160
The crux of the problem, however, is that the quota for Harrisburg has been
full for many years. Indeed, as Justice Douglas pointed out,
. . . the quota is more than full, as a result of a grandfather
clause in the law limiting licenses to one per 1,500 inhabitants.
There are presently 115 licenses in effect in Harrisburg, and based
on 1970 census figures, the quota would be 45.11
The acquisition and retention of licenses, then, represents a state-operated
monopoly. By allowing discriminatory practices in the exercise of the valua-
ble state license,
159. Id.
160. 92 S. Ct. at 1973 [emphasis added).
161. Id. at 1976 n.2 (citations omitted).
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the State of Pennsylvania is putting the weight of its liquor license,
concededly a valued and important adjunct to a private club, be-
hind racial discrimination. 1 2
The status of state-enforced private discrimination is left in a state of lim-
bo. Observers can only wait for some further judicial definition.
7. Deliberate Inaction by the State or Its Officers in the Face
of Widespread Racial Discrimination
Is there such a stance as state neutrality following a century of racial dis-
crimination? Is not the inaction of the state-its refusal to take positive
steps to eradicate the vestiges and scars of slavery and racial exploitation-
itself an action involving the State in the continuing denial of the equal pro-
tection of the laws? Though difficult to substantiate in particular cases by
rallying the necessary contextual evidence, proof of such inaction is proof of
constitutional default tantamount to state action.
In the cases emphasizing the positive duties of the State to provide for the
equal protection of the laws Reitman v. Mulkey,1 63 is clearly a focal point of
analysis of those attempts at neutrality that have failed to win at court.
Since 1959, the State of California has seen three successive powerful
civil rights acts-the Unruh Act of 1959,114 the Hawkins Act,16 5 and the
Rumford Fair Housing Act of 1963.1c6 The last act prohibited racial dis-
crimination in the sale or rental of any private dwelling of more than four
units. The state referendum in 1966 on Proposition Fourteen 6 7 was de-
signed to test these acts. In the Reitman case, where a mixed racial couple
was refused the right to rent an apartment, the constitutionality of the refer-
endum itself, as well as its result, was tested and found wanting.
Proposition Fourteen expressly did not apply to the sale or rental of any
property owned by the State or any subdivision thereof. Yet the Califor-
nia Supreme Court found Proposition Fourteen unconstitutional because its
162. Id.
163. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
164. WEST. CAL. CIV. CODE, §§ 51-52 (West Supp. 1971).
165. WEST. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§ 35700-35741 (West Supp. 1971).
166. WEST. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§ 35700-35744 (West Supp. 1971).
The Unruh Act superseded the Hawkins Act and was enforceable by the State Fair
Employment Practice Commission.
167. Section 26 of Article I of the California Constitution begins:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or
abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or de-
sires to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real property, to decline to
sell, lease or rent such property to such person or persons as he, in his ab-
solute discretion, chooses.
CAL. CONST., art. I, § 26.
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"immediate objective," "ultimate impact," and the "historical context and
conditions existing prior to its enactment" were such that its passage re-
sulted in the encouragement and authorization in the State of widespread
racial discrimination in housing. 168 The conclusion that Proposition Four-
teen encourages discrimination did not depend upon a showing that the pri-
vate acts involved in the six cases argued simultaneously before the Court
or any private action were, in fact, caused by Proposition Fourteen. The
events leading to the referendum and the wording itself were held to be un-
constitutional encouragement of racial discrimination. 169  The Supreme
Court did not re-examine the factual situation, but affirmed the decision of
California's Supreme Court on the assumption that the state court could
best assess the total impact on the life of the State. 170 The Court maintained
that Proposition Fourteen was more than a repealer; it was a positive en-
couragement to individuals to violate the right to contract of Negroes.1
7'
Citing Burton, Peterson, Robinson and Lombard 7 2 the Court held that
no State can under pretense of taking a neutral stance make the right to
discriminate one of the basic policies of the State.
Under the fourteenth amendment the State must seek the ideal of equality
and fundamental fairness for all its citizens. The obligation of the State to
favor some minorities, particularly the indigent, can be read into Griffin
v. Illinois,173 Douglas v. California,'7 4 Gideon v. Wainwright175 and Anders
v. California.'76 Inaction in all these circumstances is functional encourage-
ment of racial exploitation. The courts have used the affirmative duty
rationale in application to the fourteenth amendment only sparingly, and
only in cases where discrimination could not be tolerated in matters of sub-
stantial life concern and only where the traditional state action was hard to
find. There is no clear formulation of what constitutes the test as it now
seems to run through the balance of Reitman, Evans, Burton, and Shelley.
But the test is surely there. It is less a single act than a context of facts and
circumstances, conditions and conveyed attitudes that serve to authorize,
encourage, or tolerate the very racial discrimination which federal policy
168. Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825 (1966).
169. For a description of the political events leading to the referendum, see
CASSTEVENS, PoLIncs, HOUSING, AND RACE RELATIONS: CALIFORNIA'S RUMFORD ACT
AND PROPOSION 14, 232-40 (1967). Until 1951, racial discrimination was the offi-
cial policy of the National Association of Real Estate Boards. See also, 387 U.S. at 381.
170. 387 U.S. at 376.
171. Id. at 377.
172. Id. at 378, 380.
173. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
174. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
175. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
176. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
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has held intolerable for these past two decades. Under the rationale of
Reitman there is no reason why the Constitution cannot be interpreted to
require the States to take positive steps in unique circumstances to protect
the substantive right of equal justice and opportunity from impairment by
any individual or group of individuals.
The principle that the failure of the government to act can be a constitu-
tional violation of individual liberty was established in the leading case of
Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Company177 in 1926, where the failure of
a state public utilities commission to act for two years on a requested rate
increase was held an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due
process. It was repeated in Catlette v. United States,178 where a sheriff
stood by and watched a group of irate citizens attack and break up a meet-
ing of Jehovah Witnesses. In a race relations case, Huey v. Barloga,179 the
mob murder of a black child was laid to the charge of the trustees, em-
ployees and agents of a town who had neglected to protect persons from
intimidation and violence used against them as part of a system of dis-
crimination. The knowing neglect of the duty to protect the citizenry was
itself held to be an act of discrimination violative of the equal protection
clause.
Conclusion
The state action requirement of the self-executing equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment was originally purposed to preserve a balance
in the federal system through a decentralization of the administration of the
national interests, among which equal protection of the laws is paramount,
and some limited power to make substantive and remedial policy defining
the reach of these national interests. Today, the political theory which ac-
knowledges the duty of federal government to provide jobs, social security,
medical care, and housing extends to the field of human rights. It imposes
an obligation upon the federal system to promote liberty, equality, and
dignity. For two decades the recognition of this duty has been the most
creative force in the development of constitutional law. The recent inter-
position of Adickes and Moose Lodge represents, it is hoped, little more than
a slight divergence in this ongoing struggle.
177. 270 U.S. 587 (1926).
178. 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943).
179. 277 F. Supp. 864 (N.D. 111. 1967).
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